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Over recent months, IGPA has developed multiple Pandemic Stress 
Indicators, designed to evaluate the social and economic effects of the COVID-
19 pandemic on Illinois residents. The first stress indicator is a frequent poll of 
three sets of experts about pandemic policies. Experts on economics, public 
health, and/or vulnerable populations from across Illinois have generously 
agreed to provide regular opinions on various pandemic policies. In 
answering the surveys, all panelists provide only their personal views and do 
not offer official positions on behalf of their respective institutions. 
The ninth wave of the Pandemic Stress Indicator Expert panel survey was 
launched on October 25, and we had 18 total responses. One item of the ninth 
survey related to what some regard as a fundamental tension in policymaking 
just now, protecting public health and protecting the economy. We noted 
some cross-national data showing that the general publics in several 
democracies continue to favor the former, but less dramatically than was the 
case months back. Table 1 summarizes some recent findings about mass 
opinion in this regard.[i] 
Respondents in national surveys were asked to pick one of the following: 
“The priority for the Government should be to limit the spread of the disease 
and the number of deaths, even if that means a major recession or depression, 
leading to businesses failing and many people losing their jobs”; or, “The 
priority for the Government should be to avert a major recession or 
depression, protecting many jobs and businesses, even if that means the 





We did not pose that same choice to our respondents, but, instead, asked 
them to characterize their reaction to this multi-nation, public-opinion shift, as 
“surprising” and/or “worrying.” Fourteen of the 18 respondents found the 
trend not surprising but worrying. The few dissenters were one respondent 
who thought the trends neither surprising nor worrying, one who rejected the 
question framing as a false dichotomy, while declining to react to it, and two 
who thought the pattern is both surprising and worrying. So, even while 
more citizens of democracies continue to say that they prioritize disease 
control, more than half a year into this pandemic, most of the experts in our 
panel are anxious to see that priorities are shifting at all towards averting 
recession or depression, in lieu of preventing disease spread. Ideally, of 
course, governments aim to prevent both surges in cases and a prolonged, 
deep economic slump. But, with seven months of experience of a variety of 
policy mixes across the globe, it is far from clear how best to protect both at 
once. 
We also asked respondents to rate some claims made in popular debates 
about pandemic policy, with the response options “definitely untrue”, 
“probably untrue”, “unsure about truth”, “probably true”, and “definitely 
true”. In Table 2, we arrange the first set of items, mostly related to actions by 
public officials, by perceived truth, using abbreviated labels. 
Almost all of the respondents agreed that “Many Americans' interpretations 
of pandemic policies have been strongly driven by partisanship” and also that 
“State comparisons in the US prove that shutdowns delayed new cases, 
protecting hospital and ‘buying time’." There was a little more uncertainty 
about the companion item referencing “Country comparisons,” perhaps 
suggesting that most of our respondents have paid more attention to 
American data and experiences to date. While majorities believe as well that 
shutdowns “substantially reduced COVID deaths,” the same pattern of higher 
confidence for the American claim than the international one shows up, and 
more respondents were unsure in both cases, as compared to the “delayed 
cases” argument. 
Some critics of prolonged shutdowns have alleged that the Imperial College 
forecast models produced by Neil Ferguson and colleagues, much discussed 
in the spring, and cited by government officials in many countries, were a 
“buggy mess”, “apocalyptic,” and “so wrong they were like shots in the 
dark.”[i] We asked if the models were too pessimist and too influential, and 






Finally, in the blame debate, opinions vary on how much responsibility lies 
with China, where the virus began. We asked about the claims that, “Chinese 
officials deliberately lied about the novel coronavirus following the outbreak 
in Wuhan” and “If China and the WHO had not misled the world, this global 
pandemic might have been averted.” The former item divided the experts, 
while they were mainly willing to deny the latter as probably or definitely not 
true. 
Table 3 shows a second set of claims, this time more medical in nature, 
regarding pandemic outcomes and policies. The format was similar, as we 
asked respondents to assess them for truth. Again, our intention was not to 
score our respondents as right or wrong, but only to discover how unified 





The highest consensus emerged on the question of whether masks and facial 
covering protect others, by reducing the likelihood of spread (given infection). 
The companion claim that masks also protect the wearer saw more doubt, but 
“definitely true” was still the most common response. 
Most respondents believe that those over 65 years of age are at higher risk of 
contracting COVID-19 than other adults, and that children are at lower risk 
than adults, but there was some skepticism and/or uncertainty about both 
claims, particularly the latter. In regard to two alleged bad side effects of 
shutdowns, our respondents think that increased domestic abuse is true, but 
are quite unsure about whether suicides have been on the rise. 
We again confronted the panelists with recent Illinois data, asking for some 
medium-term forecasts. In mid-September we had asked for predictions about 
daily new COVID-19 cases and daily deaths of those with COVID-19 as of the 
end of October. By October 25, with only a few days to go before that 
prediction point, it seemed clear that the correct predictions would turn out to 
be that both would be substantially higher.  
Figure 1, below, was included in wave nine. It shows the data provided with 
the August and September survey waves (seventh and eighth, respectively), 
plus the updated series for daily new COVID cases, as of October 25. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the response option we gave for the answer 
“substantially the same” in September was too narrow an interval, as we 
probably over-reacted to the flattening in the trend line. Notwithstanding our 
mistake, respondents also seem to have been too optimistic: 68% expected no 
change, only 23% thought that the trend would be higher, and the balance 
were unsure. Sadly, the September slowdown in the new-case rate proved to 





In the October survey, we asked for end-of-year predictions, as we had in 
August. Table 4 shows that responses were rather pessimistic, with no 
respondents predicting a decline. This report was delayed, slightly, by the 
election, and the data for early November display an even sharper rise than 
was ongoing at survey time. The top category of “above 5,000” may 
ultimately seem to have been set far too low, in the absence of a major reversal 





The survey also again featured a companion question about daily deaths of 
those with COVID-19. Figure 2 is the relevant analog to Figure 1. Again, the 
correct answer about the end of October, as compared to September 10, 
turned out to be that the trend was substantially higher. As with cases, our 
September respondents were too optimistic, with only 24% having predicted 
an increase, against 64% expecting the same rate, 9% a decline, and 4% 
reporting being uncertain. 
Table 4 shows that October expectations for the end-of-the-year death trend 
are more dispersed than those for the case trend. The modal answer was forty 
to fifty-nine an interval that included the status quo (a predicted value of 
forty-two) on the survey launch date. As of November 4, the increase shown 





Continuing in the forecasting mode, we also asked respondents about new 
mitigations and regional classifications, as follows. “As of October 25, all 11 
regions of Illinois are still classified as being in Phase 4 (Revitalization). Four 
of the 11 regions—1 (Southern), 5 (North), 7 (South Suburban), and 8 (West 
Suburban)—have additional mitigation measures in effect, restricting bar and 
restaurant operations and maximum permitted meeting size. Region 1 is at 
"tier 2" while the others are at "tier 1" of mitigation. These were imposed as a 
consequence of test positivity rates. With which of the following claims do 
you agree? You may select as many as you like.”  
Table 5 shows the number of respondents who selected each option. In short, 
no one expects improved classifications, and nearly everyone expects further 
mitigation measures in the near future. Substantial minorities (not the same 7 
individuals) also expect more revision of the criteria for restrictions, a re-
classification by phase (which presumes exhaustion of the three tiers of 
mitigation measures), or new restrictions being imposed statewide, rather 





Voting is over, but vote counting continues. By the next survey wave, which 
will be the final one in 2020, we should know almost all of the results of the 
2020 election. We plan to explore experts’ expectations about how policies will 
change in the new year, and update their forecasts for vaccine availability. 
  
Appendix. Survey Questions 
W9. Q1. In the last two waves of this survey series, we asked for predictions 
about daily new COVID-19 case levels. We provided a figure showing data 
from March to just before the survey date. Above is another such figure. 
[Figure 1, above.] The red series shows the trend as of wave 7, in mid-August, 
when it was climbing and just under 2000. The blue series shows the trend as 
of Wave 8, launched September 10. It was flattening at around 1800. In that 
survey, we asked for a forecast about whether levels would be substantially 
higher, the same, or lower at the end of October. With less than a week to go, 
it looks certain that "higher" will prove to have been the correct answer.  
What do you think (average) daily new-case levels in Illinois will be at the end 
of December 2020?  





• under 1,000 
• I'm unsure 
W9. Q2. We have also asked for forecasts of daily deaths of those with COVID-
19. Below is a similar figure showing the data with smoothed trends that we 
presented in survey waves 7 and 8. [Figure 2, above.] In the 8th survey, we 
asked for a prediction for the end of October, with the options: less than 12; 
between 13 and 29; and above 30. As of October 25, it appears that "higher" 
will also prove to have been the correct answer, though the change is less 
dramatic than with cases data shown above. The predicted value for October 
25 is 37 (the seven-day average was 42 and the actual data point for that day 
was 24).  
What do you think will be average number of daily deaths from COVID-19 at 
the end of December 2020?    





• less than 19 
• I'm unsure 
W9. Q3. [Question text reproduced above. Exact response options below.] 
With which of the following claims do you agree? You may select as many as 
you like.  
• More regions are likely to have additional mitigation measures imposed before the end of 
2020. 
• Some regions are likely to shift back to Phase 3 (Recovery) before the end of 2020. 
• The whole state is likely to have additional mitigation measures imposed before the end of 
2020. 
• Criteria for phase classification and mitigation measures are likely to be adjusted again 
before the end of 2020. 
• Some regions are likely to shift to Phase 5 (Illinois Restored) before the end of 2020. 
• Some regions are likely to have additional mitigation measures imposed because of 
hospitalization data. 
W9. Q4. More than half a year has passed since the pandemic reached the 
United States. Many debates continue about best and worst policies and 
decisions, with both forward- and backward-looking perspectives. We're 
interested in your assessment of some of the claims made in such 
discussions.    [Response options: “definitely true”, “probably true”, “unsure 
about truth”, “probably untrue”, and “definitely true.”] 
-The Imperial College forecast models, much discussed in the spring, were too 
pessimistic. 
-The Imperial College forecast models were too influential. 
-Country comparisons prove that shutdowns substantially reduced COVID 
deaths. 
-State comparisons in the US prove that shutdowns substantially reduced 
COVID deaths. 
-Country comparisons prove that shutdowns delayed new cases, protecting 
hospitals and "buying time." 
-State comparisons in the US proved that shutdowns delayed new cases, 
protecting hospital and "buying time." 
-Many Americans' interpretations of pandemic policies have been strongly 
driven by partisanship. 
-Chinese officials deliberately lied about the novel coronavirus following the 
outbreak in Wuhan. 
-If China and the WHO had not misled the world, this global pandemic might 
have been averted. 
  
W9. Q5. We would also like your assessments of some claims that are more 
directly related to the biology and/or medical side of the crisis.   [same 
response options as Q4.] 
  
-Children are at much lower risk of contracting COVID-19 than young adults. 
-Those over 65 are at much higher risk of contracting COVID-19 than younger 
adults. 
-Masks and facial coverings substantially reduce the wearer's likelihood of 
spreading COVID-19. 
-Masks and facial coverings substantially reduce the wearer's likelihood of 
contracting COVID-19. 
-Many of those who recover from COVID-19 will still suffer some long-term 
health effects. 
-Suicides have increased substantially during the pandemic and ensuing 
shutdowns. 
-Cases of domestic abuse have increased substantially during the pandemic 
and ensuing shutdowns. 
W9. Q6. There is some evidence in cross-national surveys that publics are 
lately placing more weight on economics and less on public health in their 
views about optimal pandemic policy. For example, the KEKST CNC "Covid-
19 Opinion Tracker" has repeatedly asked respondents to choose 
between: “The priority for the Government should be to limit the spread of 
the disease and the number of deaths, even if that means a major recession or 
depression, leading to businesses failing and many people losing their jobs”; 
and “The priority for the Government should be to avert a major recession or 
depression, protecting many jobs and businesses, even if that means the 
disease infects more people and causes more deaths.” Americans have gone 
from 61% (disease), 20% (recession) in April to 51% (disease), 32% (recession) 
in October (about 20% declined to choose each time). For other countries, the 
same change has been: from 54%-26% to 43%-36% in Germany; from 74%-13% 
to 52%-28% in the UK; from 60%-16% to 43%-25% in Japan; and from 54%-
24% to 40%-32% in Sweden. How do you regard these shifts? 
• They are neither surprising nor worrying. 
• They are not surprising, but are worrying. 
• They are surprising, but not worrying. 








[i] The data in Table 5 come from the KEKST CNC "Covid-19 Opinion 
Tracker.” See https://www.kekstcnc.com/insights/covid-19-opinion-tracker-
edition-5. Our survey summarized the findings, but not in tabular form (see 
W9. Q6 in the Appendix). 
[i] Douglas Axe, William M. Briggs, and Jay W. Richards, The Price of Panic: 
How the Tyranny of Experts Turned A Pandemic into a Catastrophe (Washington, 
DC: Regnery, 2020), xiv, 87, quoting others in regard to “buggy mess.”. 
  
 
 
